Unit 16: The End Game The Downing Street Declaration, and the Ceasefires
Commentary
The violence of 1993 looked to derail the peace process and set Northern Ireland on the road to another 25 years of bloodshed. However, after the horrible violence of October 1993, the Irish and British Governments issued the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) in December 1993. This was the beginning of the “endgame.” Billy Hutchinson said in 1995: “The Downing Street Declaration came at the right time. It was a flawed, but balanced document.” (personal interview 1995). The IRA in its ceasefire statement recognized this also stating: “We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution, nor was it presented as such by its authors.” They, as the Loyalists did, recognized that this could be the basis of a negotiated settlement. (To see a different analysis of how the IRA leadership viewed and used the statement go back to Moloney's chapter on the Ceasefire.)
However, before either side could get to the ceasefires, the violence continued. But, at least now there was something concrete politically to work with. The antagonists really were beginning to move the military conflict into the political arena. So, along with the "secret” contacts taking place between the different paramilitary groups, the contacts between the IRA and the British Government, and the Republic of Ireland and the CLMC, there at least appeared to be a way out of the terrible violence and particularly the violence of 1993-1994. When looking back on this period Gusty Spence said: “The public looked into the abyss. We have been in the abyss. We have clawed our way out of the abyss . . .” and the DSD is what gave them a chance to claw out of that abyss.
Required Readings
DSD – The Full Text (very short –but its impact was huge): Make sure you understand why this document was so important to the peace process. Read it closely and analyze so that you can understand why both the Republicans and the Loyalists found this as an acceptable basis for discussion and a way out of the war.
Chapter 23 in Provos – Focus on the impact of the DSD at the end of the chapter.
pp. 196-199 in McKittrick
pp. 225-226 in Loyalists
Bernadette (Devlin) McAliskey criticism of the Peace Process and the DSD.
pp. 92-100 in Edwards and McGrattan
Commentary (cont.): The 1994 Ceasefires
“IT’S OVER” blared the headlines of the Belfast Telegraph of 31 August 1994. After 25 long, bloody and torturous years the “war” was over. Many in Northern Ireland, particularly the nationalist areas, celebrated the ceasefire and hoped the “war” was truly and finally over. Or was it? That is a question we will deal with later. We do know from recent events and the bombing at Canary Wharf in 1996 and the continuing sectarian attacks in Northern Ireland that it is not completely over. There may be peace, but in this context that really means an absence of war. It is really an “Armed Peace” where all sides view each other warily while holding on to their arsenals, spies and preparing for war if indeed it comes again. Still what has happened is that the military struggle has, for the most part, been transformed into a political struggle. In this section we will study and analyze why these ceasefires occurred at this point and what was necessary to make these ceasefires happen.
Required Reading
pp. 343-348 in Provos
E-Reserves: Ed Moloney - Chapter 15 in A Secret History of the IRA, "Ceasefire"
his chapter is extremely important in understanding the shifts and struggles that took place within the IRA and how they adapted to the realization that they, although they never say it, could no longer win the war militarily. This is a very good illustration of the transformation of the military struggle into a political struggle.
Keep in mind when reading Moloney that this analysis is HOTLY disputed by the present Sinn Fein leadership and many volunteers who are still loyal to Sinn Fein.
Those who are "dissenting" or "dissident" Republicans would support Moloney's analysis.
Republican Ceasefire, 31 August 1994—After reading the background information, read the text of the IRA Ceasefire statement. Pay close attention to the language used and analyze it to see what it is and is not saying.
Gerry Adams on the IRA Ceasefire Statement—Listen to the Ceasefire Statement.
Both Ceasefire Statements in video. Go to :50 to watch Adams and the Ceasefire.
Go to
For Background on the Loyalist Ceasefire
"Whither Loyalism"—Reread the section dealing with the CLMC ceasefire and why it took place in October 1994.
Read Chapter 19 in Loyalists
CLMC Ceasefire – 13 October 1994
Gusty Spence reading the CLMC Ceasefire Statement—in Real Audio
Both Ceasefire Statements in video. Go to 1:36 to watch Spence read the statement
Go to
Study Questions
Who do you believe had to travel the furthest to the ceasefires?
Explain how the leadership of Sinn Fein was able to get the IRA to declare a ceasefire without achieving its stated goals for ending the war.
What role did the prison experience play in the movement to the eventual ceasefires? (Think about where the Loyalist “rethink” took place and where the IRA developed the strategy of the “long war.”)
Some Loyalists we have studied believe that it was their ability to take the “war to the IRA” that brought the IRA to the table. Do you think this is true?
Explain Bernadette McAliskey’s resistance to the DSD and the IRA ceasefire.
These are “thought” questions for you. After reading and listening to the two ceasefire statements contrast them and analyze them. Then answer the following questions for yourself.
What do you see as the main differences, if any between the two Cease-Fire statements?
What are they really saying?
What aren’t they saying?
What role do you think religion played ,if any, in the phrasing of the statements?
Is the war over for the IRA?
For the CLMC?
Has the conflict moved into a different arena?