Commentary

Paul Dixon argues that the British government, since the beginning of the conflict, sought to act as an “impartial” arbitrator.  This is exemplified by the attempts at finding the “middle ground” in Northern Ireland and the engagement with the IRA in 1972 and 1975, Sunningdale and the Assembly.  What we will see, particularly with the AIA, is the realization by the British that, if the Nationalist population was going to be accommodated and brought into a political settlement, then there had to be an Irish Dimension to the resolution. (This was recognized in Sunningdale.)  But, what they also had to do was find a way to bring the Unionist/Loyalist community to the table.  This was probably the most difficult aspect of this process.  The collapse of Sunningdale had shown the limits to which the Unionist/Loyalist population could be pushed and what the British government could actually do to end the conflict politically.  The violent reaction by Unionism and Loyalism to the AIA brought this limitation into sharp relief again.

However, what this accord did was to bring an "All-Ireland" dimension to any solution to the Troubles, regardless of what the Unionist/Loyalist objections were.  From this point on Dublin would have influence in Northern Ireland and, most importantly, it could become a broker, along with London, in bringing the Republicans to the table and negotiating a settlement. Ironically, as we will see, the involvement, so strongly rejected by Unionists and Loyalists, in the affairs of Northern Ireland was crucial in 1994 in securing the CLMC (Loyalist) Ceasefire. 

On the other hand, as you will see in Edwards and McGrattan, the AIA led to more violence, and actually made it more difficult to get the SDLP to negotiate with Unionism and seek agreement directly with them. 

Required Readings

• AIA at CAIN

•  BBC –AIA

•  Chapter 8 in McKittrick 

• pp. 81-85 in Edwards and McGrattan

Commentary (cont.): The Stalemate

One of the AIA’s goal was to provide a framework for peace and find a way out of the stalemate that had settled over the conflict. On another level the British Government was looking for a way to undercut the growing support for Sinn Fein and give a boost to the SDLP.  However, this did not accomplish these goals. The Unionist/Loyalist community reacted in a way that the Thatcher government never anticipated.  There were massive demonstrations in Belfast where hundreds of thousands of Unionists and Loyalists stood together against the AIA.  Fearing that the border was under threat again, Loyalist paramilitaries reacted as they always had, and raised the level of violence.  The IRA again felt it was winning the war because of the AIA and the fact that the Thatcher government had finally said “NO!” to the Unionist/Loyalist opposition and raised its level of violence culminating in the Baltic Exchange and Shankill bombings.  (This is a Loyalist Site, but it gives you a sense of the horror of that day.) So, the violence and killing continued and escalated as each side committed itself to winning the war or at the least preventing the other side from winning the war.  And, to make matters worse, from the British point of view, Sinn Fein continued to gain more and more support eventually supplanting the SDLP as the largest Nationalist/Republican Party in Northern Ireland.