Commentary

In this section we examine the attempt of the British government to find that “great moderate middle” ground that they sincerely believed existed (see Dixon) and hoped would enable them to end the “Troubles” and thus bring their troops out.  However, they would be sorely disappointed in this belief.  Instead, what they discovered, was that there was no vast middle ground; they could bring politicians together, who could then find common ground as they worked closely together, but they could not bring the great mass of people on either side, especially the Unionist/Loyalist side, along with them.  The common ground the politicians discovered when locked away did not translate back to their constituents “on the ground.” Many Unionists/Loyalists feared the peace moves were evidence that the IRA had bombed and shot its way into a position where the British government would do anything to be rid of Northern Ireland.  They believed that the first peace process was but one step along the road to a United Ireland.  After the shocks of the 1972 IRA Ceasefire, the disbandment of the "B" Specials and the proroguing of Stormont, the Unionist/Loyalist community believed (as did the IRA) that the IRA was winning, and therefore, they, reacted accordingly.  (Ironically, the IRA also opposed Sunningdale, fearing it would undercut their struggle to expel Britain from Ireland.)  This is not to say this perception is correct, but it is crucial to understand this perception in order to comprehend the ferocity of the Loyalist working class resistance to Sunningdale and also the atrocities at Dublin and Monaghan in 1974.  (This is not to justify any atrocity by the Loyalists, but to say that you need to understand what they were thinking when they carried out these attacks.) Pay close attention to Dixon’s discussion of Sunningdale and how he argues it was self-doomed to failure as it was tilted too far towards Nationalism.

Required Readings

10.1          Prelude to Sunningdale

1. pp. 90-95 in McKittrick

10.2     Sunningdale

1. pp. 95-102 in McKittrick – Focus on how it was viewed.
2. pp 39-56 in Edwards and McGrattan
3. Wilson's Doomsday Plan
4. Listen to BBC Programme on the Doomsday Plan

Recommended:

• Declassified Government Documents dealing with Sunningdale

Commentary (cont.): Loyalist Reaction to Sunningdale

Beyond understanding the power of the Loyalist working class and what it could do when organized, be aware that one of the real lessons of the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) strike was that it demonstrated to the British government that the issue of ‘consent’ i.e. the consent of the majority population was going to be crucial in any political settlement in Northern Ireland and that even if/when the British wanted to leave it would only be when the Loyalist/Unionist wanted them to leave.

Required Readings

• Summary of The UWC Strike at CAIN and also at the BBC and you can get the UWC Strike Documents at CAIN at the bottom of the page.

• pp. 102-107 in McKittrick

• Go to Courseweb, video, Loyalist, UWC to watch the video of Wilson's Sponger's speech and also to see documentary footage on the Strike.

Commentary (cont.) Alienation of Loyalist community

What should become clear here is how the British political establishment really did not understand Northern Ireland and how people on both sides viewed their actions.  Earlier we saw how the Army and the government alienated the Nationalist community by their actions and policies; in this phase we  witness how they alienated the Unionist/Loyalist community.   This was clearly illustrated during the UWC Strike when Harold Wilson, the British Prime  Minister, called the strikers “spongers” in a speech that has become known as the “Spongers Speech.”  (Go to Courseweb, video, Loyalist, UWC to watch the video of his speech.) Make sure you watch the videos here.

Commentary (cont.): Impact of the Strike on the IRA

This strike and the Loyalist offensive and also the British assault, militarily and politically, took its toll on the IRA and a new, younger and Northern leadership began to emerge. It was this cadre that eventually developed the long-term military and political strategy.

Required Reading

1.         pp. 107 -111 in McKittrick

Commentary (cont.): Loyalist Backlash

The Loyalist working class reacted in a most violent way. Until the Omagh atrocity, carried out by the Real IRA, the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings was the most deadly day of attacks and bombings, including the IRA’s bombing of Belfast on “Bloody Friday.”  This also began the period of the Shankill Butchers, a gang that carried out some of the worst individual killings in the “Troubles.”

Required Reading:

•  Dublin and Monaghan Bombings and/or Justice for the Forgotten

  • Tribute to the Victims of Dublin-Monaghan

  • Returning the Serve - Watch this video on Dublin-Monaghan where David Ervine talks about the bombing.

    • Courseweb - VIDEO FILES > DUBLIN MONAGHAN BOMBINGS > RETURNING THE SERVE

  • Documentary Footage

    • Courseweb VIDEO FILES > DUBLIN MONAGHAN BOMBINGS > DOCUMENTARY FOOTAGE

•  pp. 125-126 in Loyalists – Make sure you are aware of how these fit into the period under study and what was going on, especially fear over the border and a sellout by Britain.  Pay close attention here to David Ervine’s comments from Loyalists regarding this.

•  pp. 114-117 in McKittrick – McKittrick focuses here on the continuation of violence in response to the collapse of Sunningdale.  This was a period marked by increasing sectarian violence and a marked increase of Loyalist violence.  You can see on page 329 in McKittrick in 1975 the combination of Loyalist groups had “out-killed” the combined Republican groups.   Part of the mentality that underpinned Loyalist violence, beyond simple sectarianism (which was a significant factor), was the conviction that they would not be bombed and shot into a United Ireland.  They would fight and did fight viciously in this period.  It would not be until much later that Loyalism would develop a political vision for ending the conflict.

•  Shankill Butchers- In a conflict known for its ferocity and for its atrocities, the “Butchers” stood out even here.  I will not go into their methods. You can read about them through the link I have provided here.  Their targets were not military, but civilian and their goal was to kill as brutally as possible and thus to strike terror into the hearts of ordinary Nationalists.

Recommended Reading

1.         The Full Barron Report (all 488 pages are here) - This is for your own interest and is the Irish Republic’s Governmental Report published in December on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.  

Study Questions

1. Analyze and explain why there was no middle ground in 1974 to make Sunningdale work.

2. Explain what the Unionist/Loyalist objections were to Sunningdale.

3. Explain why the Provisional IRA also opposed Sunningdale.

4. What assumptions of the British bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland were destroyed by the failure of Sunningdale? (p. 158 in Dixon)

5. Explain how the politicians involved in Sunningdale could have been so wrong in thinking they could sell Sunningdale to their constituencies.

6. What were some of the lessons the British government learned as a result of the UWC strike and the collapse of Sunningdale?

7. Explain why the Loyalist violence intensified in this period and why they chose to attack the Republic of Ireland in 1974.

8. Explain how the strike and its aftermath affected Provisional IRA thinking.

9. Do you agree with Dixon that the Unionists were pushed too far with Sunningdale or was it a fair and balanced settlement?

Terms and People to Know from this Unit

1. UWC (Ulster Workers’ Council) Strike

2. Dublin/Monaghan Bombings

3. Sunningdale

4. The Executive

5. "Moderate Silent Majority”

6. The “Irish Dimension”

7. Edward Heath

8. Jack Lynch

9. Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution

10. Majority Consent

11. “Unionist Veto”

12. UUUC (United Ulster Unionist Council)

13. The “Spongers” Speech

14. Harold Wilson

15. “Shankill Butchers”