Unit 9: The IRA and the Beginnings of the Long War

Unit 9: The IRA and the Beginnings of the “Long War”

Commentary

After 1972 certain elements within the IRA realized that it was in for the “long haul” and realized that it would not defeat the British government by purely military means alone. However, not until the failure of the 1975 IRA Ceasefire and the ascendancy of the Northern leadership in the IRA would a rethink take place and a new strategy developed to deal with the changed circumstances. This policy did not involve compromise, although that is eventually what happened. Instead, the new IRA leadership envisioned using politics and the armed struggle to force Britain out of and reunite Ireland.

The British, for their part, tried to find an “exit strategy” that would allow them to extricate themselves from Northern Ireland without leaving chaos in their wake. However, the actions of the British government, especially in dealing face-to-face with the IRA, to seek a way out of the conflict and address the concerns of the Nationalist population and the IRA campaign only served to heighten Loyalist/Unionist fears of a sellout.

So, in this section and the period under study it became clear that this conflict would not end simply by the British pulling out the army or declaring their intent to leave Northern Ireland and repeal the Act of Union. It became abundantly clear that the Loyalist/Unionist fears of a sellout and desire to stay part of the UK had to be addressed. Failure to do so would have and did have disastrous consequences for the Nationalist population, particularly in this period.

Required Readings

1. pp. 210-217 in Provos

2. p. 198 in Provos

Commentary (cont.): The 1972 Ceasefires

The British hoped to achieve some sort of settlement with the IRA, while the IRA viewed this as the time to push its “maximum” programme. As you will see from the readings, neither side had a great deal of appreciation for the position of the other. One other point to be made here for these readings is that the British and the IRA both discounted the impact of their actions on the majority community. The IRA tended to view the Loyalist/Unionist population, who would have to deal with the IRA when the British left, as puppets or dupes of the British, while the British viewed them as people who would have to accept what they, the British, told them if they wanted Britain's continued support. However, discounting these opinions and desires had terrible consequences for the people of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1974-1975.

What we will see in this section is the recurring theme of an upsurge of Loyalist violence when they believed the police and army did not do enough to suppress the IRA or they feared they were being sold out by the British Government. In these readings you will analyze why there were Loyalist fears and why Loyalist violence increased in this period.

1. Explain why the Provisional IRA began to view the struggle in Northern Ireland as the “long war” and came to understand that it would take at least 20 more years to win the war.

2. Analyze and explain why the Unionist/Loyalist community reacted so violently to the IRA Ceasefire and talks with the British government.

3. Why did the British government miscalculate so badly on the reactions by the Unionist/Loyalist community when their talks with the IRA became common knowledge?

4. Think about, analyze and explain why the IRA thought it could simply tell the British to leave and then the Unionists/Loyalists would have to come to an accommodation with them in a United Ireland.