History 1124

Section 3:

“The Long War and the Search for Peace: 1972-1998”

With the failure of the IRA’s "Victory 72" campaign and the arrest of many of its leaders in 1973, as you will see in your readings, the IRA had to reassess its campaign and consider how long it would take to win the war. This realization and reassessment took place in Long Kesh (later known as the Maze Prison) for the IRA. (Later in this section we will also see how the Loyalist prisoners began their reassessment of the conflict.)

Gerry Adams, who says he was never in the IRA, while locked up in Long Kesh prison in 1973 predicted that the IRA's armed struggle would go on until 1993....

In a new book on the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) evolution, (Patrick) Magee, the IRA man who almost wiped out the British Cabinet at the Tory Party conference in 1984, recalls Adams' gloomy assessment to his fellow volunteers.

'Adams asked: "Does anybody here think this war will be over in two years?" There were no takers. "Does anybody think this war'll be over in 10 years?" No. "Does anybody think this war's going to be over in twenty years?"' 

Magee continues: 'Well, we are all getting a bit worried at this stage. He [Adams] was very much aware that this was a long haul.'  Henry McDonald: Sunday, March 9, 2003, The Observer

As the various authors point out (Chapter 11 in Provos and McKittrick, p. 87) and the quote from above illustrates, this war would now be a very long and a very bloody one.  The IRA faced a reassessment, but so too did all those involved in the conflict.  Everyone involved had to face these questions about the war:

1. How long?

2. How bloody? 

3. Would the armed struggle bring about a British withdrawal as the IRA hoped? 

4. What price would the IRA and the Nationalist population be willing to pay to achieve a united Ireland?

5. Would the British government stick it out and not “cave in to terrorism” as many Loyalists and Unionists feared.

6. What would the Loyalists do?  To what lengths would they go to preserve the Union?

7. What would the Army do? 

A simple, yet callous, answer to these questions was given by Frank Steele (a former MI6 operative and British Representative to the 1972 talks with the IRA) who wrote about the collapse of the 1972 ceasefire:

The unionists didn’t want it [the ceasefire] as they wanted the British army to go on knocking hell out of the IRA.  The RUC didn’t want it as they wanted to be able to fight with the British army against the IRA and restore some credibility and morale which had taken such a knock over internment.  The Protestant paramilitaries didn’t want it as they saw themselves fighting alongside the British army against the IRA. Part of the British army didn’t want it as they reckoned the IRA could still be beaten militarily.  The hard-line IRA didn’t want it.  I know this sounds callous to say, but I don’t think either community had suffered enough to want peace, to make peace an absolute imperative.  And so we entered into something I don’t think anyone expected; twenty-five years of killing, maiming and destruction.  We [Britain] may have got fed-up but, contrary to IRA expectations, we have not gone away.  (pp. 146-147, Provos)

We can argue over who and what Steele represents, and even the “callousness” of his comments, but what we cannot argue with is his overall analysis.  Northern Ireland lived through another “twenty-five years of killing, maiming and destruction” before a political settlement could be reached.  Each group inflicted suffering on the other until a point was reached where they all realized that no one could win the war.  It was only when this point was reached (sadly as we will see, even after that, the violence continued and intensified) could a way be found to transform the conflict from a military to a political conflict.  The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 2003 Election Manifesto (which echoed statements it made in 1994 to the British Government) reflected this realization.  Section 3 of its Manifesto stated:

The Progressive Unionist Party is committed to a comprehensive programme of conflict transformation. If we are to achieve a fully functioning devolved democracy all parties will have to embrace the process of transformation. We advocate transformation rather than resolution, as unionism and nationalism are diametrically opposed political philosophies. The manner of how these competing political ideals engage can be transformed to a non-violent one.

This is a crucial point.  Since the desires and goals of Republicans and Loyalists were diametrically opposed, then resolution of the conflict could not take place, but “transformation” of the conflict into political conflict did and continues to take place. 

Our job then in Section 3 is to investigate and understand the military conflict of this period and how that conflict gradually pushed the antagonists towards a political process and a settlement that would transform the military conflict into a political conflict.  Our work from this point on then will take a twin-track approach.  We will examine and analyze the attempts at achieving a settlement from Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement on the macro level (i. e., the state level:  the British and Irish governments along with the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.).  At the same time we will examine the violence of the period and the changes taking place “on the ground” within both Loyalism and Republicanism while they continued to prosecute their wars. 

One other point needs made as we prepare to begin our work for Section 3.  The “accepted wisdom” concerning the “peace process” posits that this process was totally driven by Sinn Fein and the “pan-Nationalist Front” (Irish-America, The Republic of Ireland, the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein).  This is the thesis of Tim Pat Coogan’s The Troubles and also much of the media analysis that has appeared since the 1994 ceasefires.  But, this leaves us with an incomplete picture of how Northern Ireland moved toward a political settlement.  We need to understand the role of the Loyalist paramilitaries, their political evolution in the 1970s and 1980s and the role of their political representatives, the PUP and the UDP, throughout the peace process. Without their evolution, then regardless of any policy shifts by the British government no peace could have or would have been achieved.  Another actor overlooked in this process is the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.  During crucial phases of the peace process their representatives served as “go-betweens” for the various political parties who did not communicate directly with one another during the years 1996-1998 and then in the talks leading to the Good Friday Agreement.  Theirs was a crucial role in this period.  Therefore, it is absolutely critical, when analyzing the peace process in Northern Ireland, to understand the role of the Women’s Coalition and the political representatives of Loyalism if we are to have a complete picture of this period. 

I strongly recommend that you answer either on paper, or in your head, all the study questions throughout this section.